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PROTECTING WETLANDS: CONSIDERATION OF 
SECONDARY SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS BY 
THE UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 
IN ITS WETLANDS PERMITTING PROCESS 
Jeffrey M. Lovely· 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) regulates l 
wetland projects in the United States pursuant to Section 404 of the 
Clean Water Act (CWA).2 Expanding population pressures on land 
use have caused an alarming decline in wetlands acreage. 3 Because 
wetlands serve as important sources of flood storage, wildlife habi-
tat, and spawning areas, they constitute a vital natural resource. 4 
• Articles Editor, 1989-90, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Corps regulations implementing the Section 404 wetlands permitting process are compiled 
in 33 C.F.R. §§ 320, 323, 325, 328 (1988). 
2 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1) (1982 
& Supp. V 1987) (empowers the Corps to promulgate regulations under which the Corps may 
grant or deny the permit required by a developer to fill wetlands area). 
3 The report "Wetlands of the United States: Current Status and Recent Trends," compiled 
by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, estimates that nine million acres of wetlands 
had been lost in the 48 contiguous states between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s. The Fish 
and Wildlife Service estimated that approximately 215 million acres of wetlands existed before 
the United States was settled. As of 1985, the Service estimated that only 93.7 million acres 
of freshwater wetlands and 5.2 million acres of saltwater wetlands remain in the United 
States, and that approximately 440,000 acres of freshwater wetlands and 18,000 acres of 
saltwater wetlands are lost each year in the 48 contiguous states. Net Total of 9 Million Acres 
of Wetlands Lost in 20-Year Period, Wildlife Service Says, 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 25 (May 3, 
1985). 
4 The National Wetlands Policy Forum, convened at the request of the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), estimated that 60-90% of United States commercial 
fish catches spawn in wetlands; that wetlands are home to one third of the nation's endangered 
species; and that the costs of replacing the natural flood protection lost to wetlands fill projects 
will be "astronomical." National Wetlands Panel Seeks New Policy to Protect, Restore, 
Improve U.S. Wetlands, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1461 (Nov. 18, 1988). 
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As the primary agency5 empowered to allow or deny permits for 
wetland fill projects, the Corps bears the brunt of wetlands protec-
tion responsibilities. 6 If nationally espoused goals of "no net loss" of 
wetlands7 are to be met, the Corps must act to the fullest extent of 
its authority to protect the nation's wetlands. 
The statutory framework for such protection is already in place, 
in Section 404,8 the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
(NEPA),9 and Corps regulations. 10 Regulations permit the Corps to 
consider a broad range of factors in its wetlands permitting process. 11 
The consideration of these factors advances NEP A policies because 
the Corps considers a proposed project in light of its overall effect 
on the human environment. In both Corps regulations and NEP A, 
the term "environment" is interpreted broadly. 12 
Although Corps regulations and NEP A require a comprehensive 
examination of environmental factors, courts have not deferred to 
5 The EPA shares control of wetlands permitting, and in some cases may veto Corps 
permitting decisions. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1982 & Supp. v 1987); see infra notes 121-39 and 
accompanying text. See generally The Role of EPA's Guidelines in the Clean Water Act § 404 
Permit Program--Judicial Interpretation and Administrative Application, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. 
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,272 (July 1984); EPA's Evolving Role in Wetlands Protection: Elaboration 
in Bersani v. U.S. EPA, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,480 (Nov. 1988). 
6 For criticism of the Corps's historical pro-development stance, see Power, The Fox in the 
Chicken Coop: The Regulatory Program of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 63 VA. L. 
REV. 503 (1977). 
More recently, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) evaluated and criticized 
the Corps' wetlands permitting activities. The GAO stated that the major causes of the Corps's 
poor performance were: weakness and confusion in the definition and enforcement of wetlands 
protection regulations; disregard by the Corps of other federal agency concerns; and failure 
by the Corps to investigate reported violations and inspect projects for permit compliance. 
Protection of Critical Wetland Areas by Corps Inadequate, GAO Report Alleges, 19 Env't 
Rep. (BNA) 1121 (Sept. 20, 1988). 
7 Bush Tells GOP Governors He Will Act on Acid Rain, Wetlands, Global Warming, 19 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 1564 (Dec. 2, 1988). On November 22, 1988, President-elect 
George Bush acknowledged the need to protect our nation's wetlands because of their impor-
tance to water quality, wildlife habitat, and flood control, and emphasized the need both to 
replenish and replace lost wetlands, and to move toward a goal of "no net loss" of wetlands. 
Id. 
s 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
9 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982 & Supp. v 
1987). 
10 33 C.F.R. §§ 320, 323, 325, 328 (1988). 
11 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) requires the Corps to evaluate all relevant factors as it conducts its 
Public Interest Review (PIR) of a wetlands fill permit application, when the Corps balances 
the beneficial against the detrimental effects of a wetlands fill permit. 
12 See infra text accompanying notes 106-13. Corps regulations require the Corps officer 
processing a wetland fill permit application to consider a broad range of effects on the 
environment, including effects on wetlands, historic properties, aesthetics, recreation, and in 
general, the "needs and welfare of the people." 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (1988). 
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the agency consistently in this area, and instead have effectively 
limited the Corps's environmental review process. 13 By limiting too 
strictly the Corps's consideration of secondary social and economic 
effects, the courts may be removing an important weapon from the 
arsenal of people and agencies trying to protect the quality of the 
human environment in urban America. 14 
For example, in Mall Properties, Inc. v. Marsh15 the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts may have set a 
dangerous precedent by limiting the range of secondary social and 
economic effects the Corps may evaluate while it conducts its public 
interest review (PIR).16 There, a mall developer sought to build a 
large suburban shopping mall in North Haven, Connecticut.17 The 
neighboring city of New Haven objected to the wetlands permit 
application, alleging that potentially serious social and economic ef-
fects, including urban decay and unemployment in downtown New 
Haven, would be caused if the Corps granted the permit. 18 The Corps 
balanced these secondary effects in its PIR process, and denied the 
permit. 19 
The district court held that evaluating these particular 
secondary social and economic effects was an ultra vires exer-
cise of permitting control by the Corps,20 and remanded the 
permit application to the Corps to be reconsidered without 
evaluating the secondary' social and economic effects on 
New Haven. 21 Because the Mall Properties court read the 
proximate causation test outlined by the Supreme Court 
in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy22 
13 See infra text accompanying notes 236-81 for a discussion of case law involving Corps 
permitting decisions. 
14 See Mall Properties, Inc. v. Marsh, 672 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass. 1987), appeal dismissed, 
841 F.2d 440 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 128 (1988); see infra notes 267-81 and 
accompanying text. 
15 672 F. Supp. 56l. 
16 [d. at 565. The Corps's public interest review regulations are compiled at 33 C.F.R. 
§ 320.4(a) (1988). 
17 672 F. Supp. at 563. 
18 [d. 
19 [d. at 564. 
20 [d. at 566. 
21 [d. at 575. 
22 In Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983), the 
Supreme Court invoked the doctrine of proximate cause in determining the nexus required 
between the primary environmental impact of a project and the secondary effects of that 
project before a federal agency will be required to evaluate those effects under NEPA. See 
id. at 774; see infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text. 
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narrowly,23 it may have limited too strictly the range of factors that 
the Corps may evaluate in conducting its PIR and in weighing the 
beneficial versus the detrimental effects of a wetlands fill permit. 
This Comment argues that the CWA's goal of wetland preserva-
tion would best be served by allowing the Corps to consider the 
secondary social and economic effects of wetlands development when 
those effects are the reasonably foreseeable24 results of a permit 
issued by the Corps. Section II describes NEP A's language and 
legislative intent, discusses the background to the Corps's jurisdic-
tion over wetlands, and analyzes the judicial review process. Section 
III analyzes how the coalition of the Corps's regulations,25 NEPA,26 
and deferential judicial review27 should act to further environmental 
goals while still allowing responsible, quality development. This sec-
tion also discusses case law dealing with the consideration of sec-
ondary social and economic effects. Section IV proposes guidelines 
that the Corps and courts reviewing the Corps's actions can use to 
improve the efficiency and predictability of the Section 404 permit-
ting process. Finally, this Comment concludes that social, economic, 
and other secondary28 factors may be considered by the Corps in its 
Section 404 wetlands permitting process when they are the reason-
ably foreseeable effects of a Corps wetlands permitting decision. 
23 The Supreme Court, in Metropolitan Edison, referred both to the concept of proximate 
causation and to the policies of NEPA in determining the length of the causal chain between 
primary and secondary effects before those secondary effects must be evaluated in an EIS. 
460 U.S. at 774. This Comment argues that Mall Properties, Inc. v. Marsh, 672 F. Supp. 561 
(D. Mass 1987), appeal dismissed, 841 F.2d 440 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 128 (1988), 
read this test too narrowly, and limited too strictly the range of secondary factors the Corps 
may evaluate in its PIR. 
24 See infra notes 85-87 for discussion of the reasonable foreseeability standard. 
25 33 C.F.R. § 320 (1988). 
26 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
27 See infra notes 148-88 and accompanying text. 
28 For the purposes of this Comment, the term "primary effects" refers to the most direct 
results of a decision to grant a wetlands fill permit. For example, the primary effects of a 
decision to fill 30 acres of wetlands will include: loss of floodwater storage, loss of wildlife and 
wildlife habitat, loss of recreational areas, etc. Guidelines promulgated by the Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) refer to these primary effects as direct effects: these effects 
occur at the same time and place as the project. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (1988). 
"Secondary effects" are the less direct, but reasonably foreseeable, effects of the project. 
For instance, if a wetlands fill project will kill a substantial amount of shellfish, local clam 
fishermen will lose income because of that project. Likewise, if a large apartment is to be 
built on the 30 acres, then it is reasonably foreseeable that local traffic will increase in the 
area. CEQ regulations refer to these effects as indirect: these secondary effects are caused 
by the project in question, but occur later or at a distance from the project. [d. 
For a discussion of the purpose of the CEQ and its guidelines, see infra notes 66-79. 
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II. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 
Congress enacted NEP A to ensure that governmental agencies 
consider environmental factors whenever a proposed federal action 
could significantly affect the human environment. 29 Written broadly, 
NEP A sets no substantive standards. Rather, NEP A is designed to 
ensure that humans and nature coexist in productive harmony, while 
promoting fulfillment of human social and economic requirements 
both now and in the future. 30 
A. The Language and Spirit of the Act 
NEPA was designed to protect and preserve a broadly defined 
"natural environment. "31 Its language32 and legislative history33 in-
dicate that Congress enacted NEP A to provide an environmental 
statute to supplement and focus federal agency protection of the 
environment. NEPA's language clearly defines the environment 
broadly, and provides a generic framework for addressing environ-
mental concerns. NEPA states that the United States's environ-
mental policy is to promote measures that encourage productive 
harmony between people and nature, to prevent future and eliminate 
present environmental damage, and to stimulate overall human 
health and welfare. 34 
Congress recognized that human activity, including population 
growth, industrial expansion, high density urbanization, and use of 
resources, has a profound impact on the nation's environment. 35 This 
recognition prompted Congress to enact a policy that uses all prac-
ticable means and measures to promote the general welfare of soci-
ety, productive harmony between humans and nature, and the social 
and economic fulfillment of present and future generations of Amer-
icans. 36 NEPA's language manifestly expresses tremendous breadth: 
29 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
30 [d. § 4331(a). 
31 [d. Subchapter I of NEPA, which sets out the nation's environmental policies and goals, 
recognizes "the profound impact of man's activity on the interrelations of all components of 
the natural environment," including "the profound influences of population growth, high-
density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding 
technological advances. " [d. 
32 [d. § 4335. 
33 See infra notes 47-65 and accompanying text. 
34 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
35 See id. 
36 [d. 
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the general welfare, including social and economic requirements, is 
to be protected both now and with an eye to the future, through the 
use of "all practicable means and measures. "37 
Section 10238 requires that courts and agencies interpret other 
federal policies, regulations, and public laws in accordance with NE-
PA's policies. 39 Section 102 also requires all federal agencies to utilize 
a systematic, interdisciplinary approach in investigating the envi-
ronmental consequences of a federal action, including the use of both 
natural and social scientific techniques to evaluate economic effects. 40 
Even presently unquantified environmental amenities and values are 
to be considered, and new techniques are to be developed to allow 
appropriate consideration of these unquantified values. 41 This pro-
vision exemplifies the broad and progressive nature of NEPA by 
requiring federal agencies to expand existing environmental tech-
niques to protect a more broadly defined human environment. 
Procedurally, Section 102 requires an agency to prepare an envi-
ronmental impact statement (EIS) whenever preliminary investi-
gation reveals that the agency's actions will significantly affect the 
quality of the human environment.42 An EIS must include: a detailed 
statement on the environmental impact of the proposed action; eval-
uation of adverse environmental effects that cannot be avoided if the 
proposal is implemented; discussion of less harmful alternatives; an 
analysis of short- versus long-term uses of the environment, with a 
view towards enhancing and maintaining long-term productivity; and 
an evaluation of the irreversible effects on the environment that the 
proposal would have if implemented. 43 
NEPA's language requires a comprehensive consideration of en-
vironmental impacts. But NEP A requires only that a federal agency 
evaluate these impacts. Nothing in NEP A explicitly requires an 
agency to deny a proposal because of its environmental effects. 44 
Further evidence of NEPA's procedural vagueness lies in Congress's 
positioning of the Act as supplemental to existing agency duties and 
37 Id. 
38 I d. § 4332. 
39Id. 
40 Id. § 4332(A)-(B). 
4\ Id. § 4332(B). 
42 Id. § 4332(C). 
43 Id. 
44 42 u.S.C. § 4335 (1982 & Supp. v 1987) refers to NEPA's "policies and goals" as 
"supplementary to existing agency duties." Section 102 of NEPA requires only a "detailed 
statement," not a decision based upon that statement. Id. § 4332(C). 
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regulations. 45 Both NEPA's goals and policies must be considered in 
addition to existing agency duties. 46 NEPA's legislative history does, 
however, indicate that NEP A was intended as more than a mere 
procedural overlay to existing agency duties. 
B. NEPA's Legislative History 
Consideration of NEPA's legislative history underscores the ex-
tensive goals of the Act's proponents. 47 For example, Senator Henry 
Jackson, Senate sponsor of NEPA's precursor, attempted to estab-
lish that "each person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a 
healthful environment."48 This language was limited in conference, 
however, to provide only that "each person should enjoy a healthful 
environment, "49 thus avoiding the creation of a judicially enforceable 
right. 50 Although Congress watered down some of Senator Jackson's 
language, Jackson's sponsorship did result in passage of the sweep-
ing environmental protection statute espoused by his chief advisor, 
Professor Lynton K. Caldwell of the University of Indiana. 51 
Jackson and Caldwell refused to promote a policy that added 
specific environmental duties to designated agencies. Instead, they 
sought to apply environmental requirements to all agencies with 
responsibilities affecting the environment. 52 As a result, NEP A re-
quires all agencies to actively implement national environmental 
policy by engaging in the EIS process. 53 
Perhaps the single most important aspect of NEPA's legislative 
history was Congress's refusal to adopt the Aspinall amendment. 54 
This amendment provided that NEPA would in no way increase, 
45Id. § 4335. 
46 See id. 
47 Because of the narrow scope of this Comment, review of legislative history has been 
limited to some relevant provisions in various congressional reports and debates on NEPA. 
This section relies in large part on ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 1-14 (1973); Dreyfus 
& Ingram, The National Environmental Policy Act: A View of Intent and Practice, 16 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 243 (1976); D. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW & LITIGATION: THE NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT §§ 2:02-:05 (1984 & Supp. 1987). 
48 H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1969), cited in ANDERSON, supra note 
47, at 5-6 & n.13. 
49 42 U.S.C. § 4331(C) (1982 & Supp. v 1987); see also ANDERSON, supra note 47, at 6 n.13. 
50 ANDERSON, supra note 47, at 6. 
51 See id. 
52 Id.; see also Hearings on S. 1075, S. 1073 and S. 1752 Before the Senate Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 116 (1969). 
53 ANDERSON, supra note 47, at 6; 42 U.S.C. § ~32(C) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
54 D. MANDELKER, supra note 47, at § 2:02. 
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decrease, or change any agency or official responsibility. 55 Had this 
amendment passed, it obviously would have stripped NEPA of any 
substantive effect. The Aspinall amendment was dropped in confer-
ence. 56 
During NEPA's passage through the Senate, a conflict arose be-
tween Senators Jackson and Muskie. Muskie desired to protect spe-
cific air and water pollution standards set by environmental agencies 
from interference by other agencies,57 while Jackson advocated blan-
ket legislation, eventually passed, that would apply to all federal 
agencies regardless of their specific duties. 58 The two Senators com-
promised, and a nonderogation clause was added to NEP A to protect 
specific environmental standards administered by a specified agency 
from the influence of other federal agencies. 59 
The Muskie-J ackson compromise indirectly provided for judicial 
review of NEPA-related agency decisions. The bill was altered to 
require that agencies provide a "detailed statement" instead of "find-
ings" regarding the environmental review required by NEP A. 60 Mu-
skie's rationale for altering this phrase was that a "findings" require-
ment would be difficult to challenge in court, and would protect 
agencies that had disregarded environmental concerns. 61 An addi-
tional change that enhanced agency accountability and paved the 
way for judicial review arose from the addition of language requiring 
EIS review by other federal agencies participating in the project 
requiring the EIS.62 This move from internal to external review of 
55 Id. (quoting 115 CONGo REC. 26,568-91 (1969)). 
66 Id. 
57 See id. 
58 See id. 
59 Id. The nonderogation clause states that NEPA's Section 102 does not change "the specific 
statutory obligations of any Federal agency . . . to comply with criteria or standards of 
environmental quality." 42 U.S.C. § 4334 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
60 See D. MANDELKER, supra note 47, at § 2:03; 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
61Id. Allowing an agency to state that no environmentally significant impact would be 
caused by a particular project, without requiring the agency to support that proposition with 
evidence, would greatly weaken NEPA by allowing agencies to publish mere conclusory 
statements, which would then be difficult to challenge because no factual administrative record 
would exist. 
62 See id. By allowing other involved agencies to challenge the information and evidence 
gathered and evaluated by the lead agency, Congress made the EIS requirement more than 
a mere paper hurdle for federal agencies. When other involved agencies strongly disagree 
with a lead agency's decision, they can challenge that decision in court. Thus, judicial review 
arises indirectly from the general external review provision. 
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) requires the federal official in charge to consult with other federal 
agencies that have legal jurisdiction or special expertise regarding a relevant environmental 
impact involved. 
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impact statements illustrates Congress's intent to hold agencies ac-
countable under NEPA despite NEPA's lack of specific judicial re-
view or enforcement provisions. 63 
As demonstrated in the legislative history and in the statute itself, 
NEPA constitutes an expansive statute, applicable to all federal 
agencies, designed to promote preservation and protection of the 
environment over the long term. To fulfill these goals, agencies are 
required to use an interdisciplinary array of techniques, and to con-
sider a comprehensive range of environmental factors.64 NEP A's 
breadth is, however, accompanied by procedural vagueness. This 
vagueness is only partially allayed by procedural guidelines devel-
oped by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) that define 
the terms used in NEP A and describe how to apply NEP A. 65 
C. CEQ Guidelines for Implementing NEPA 
Regulations developed by the CEQ provide definitions of terms 
used in NEP A. 66 In addition, they provide administrative guidelines 
on: purpose;67 policy;68 threshold determinations of whether an EIS 
is required;69 procedures for preparing and circulating an EIS;70 and 
overall guidance for agency decisionmaking. 71 Vital to a thorough 
understanding of how Congress intended NEP A to operate, the 
regulations specifically require that NEP A and the CEQ regulations 
be read together as a unit to ensure compliance with the spirit and 
the letter of the law. 72 
CEQ regulations require federal agencies to: interpret policies, 
regulations, and other laws in accordance with NEP A and CEQ 
regulations; encourage and facilitate public involvement in NEP A 
decisions; identify alternatives that would minimize adverse envi-
ronmental effects; and use all practicable means to restore and en-
63 See ANDERSON, supra note 47, at 13. Citing the Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 
U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1966) and L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 336 
(1965), Anderson states: U[A]s a general principle, judicial enforceability is assumed in the 
absence of a specific congressional directive either way." ANDERSON, supra note 47, at 13. 
64 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
65 Subchapter II of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-4347 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), created the 
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ). 
66 40 C.F.R. § 1508 (1988). 
67 [d. § 1500.1. 
68 [d. § 1500.2. 
69 See id. §§ 1501.3, 1508.9. 
70 [d. § 1502. 
71 [d. §§ 1500-1517. 
72 [d. § 1500.3. 
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hance the quality of the human environment. 73 As in NEP A itself, 
the language is exceptionally inclusive, using broad terms such as 
"all practicable means," and "any possible adverse effects. "74 
The CEQ regulations define terms in a manner that further illus-
trates NEPA's breadth. For instance, "effects," which must be con-
sidered in the decision of whether or not an EIS is required for a 
particular project, include both direct effects (those occurring at the 
same time and place), and indirect effects (those caused by the 
project but that occur later in time or at a distance from that proj-
ect).75 Indirect effects include growth-inducing tendencies, land use 
changes, population density and growth rate alterations, and other 
related effects on air, water, or other natural systems. 76 "Effects" 
also include ecological, aesthetic, historic, cultural, economic, social, 
or health effects, whether direct, indirect, or cumulative. 77 Thus, 
effects that must be considered by a federal agency are far from 
limited to the immediate ecological changes that might result from 
an agency's action. Instead, agencies must evaluate a comprehensive 
array of foreseeable effects. 
The CEQ definition of the term "human environment"78 further 
emphasizes the breadth of this array. This definition includes both 
the physical environment and interrelated economic, social, natural, 
and physical effects on that environment. 79 When one considers CEQ 
guidelines, NEPA's language, and the congressional intent behind 
NEP A together, it becomes clear that NEPA seeks to protect a 
broadly defined environment from a comprehensive array of harms, 
both now and in the future. To further the nation's environmental 
policy, then, federal agencies must consider social, economic, and 
other secondary effects of an action requiring preparation of an EIS 
when those secondary effects are the reasonably foreseeable prod-
ucts of that action. 
D. Judicial Limits on Agency EIS Requirements 
The Supreme Court has judicially narrowed NEPA's scope while 
still leaving room for interpretation of NEP A's broad language. In 
73 [d. § 1500.2. 
74 [d. 
75 [d. § 1508.8. 
76 [d. 
77 [d. 
78 [d. § 1508.14. 
79 [d. 
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Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy,80 the 
Court held that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was not 
required to address the contentions of a citizens group that reopening 
a nuclear reactor at Three Mile Island would cause psychological 
distress and serious damage to the stability, cohesiveness, and well-
being of neighboring communities. 81 The Court did not require the 
NRC to prepare an EIS addressing this issue because the plaintiffs 
had alleged no more than that there was a risk that psychological 
harm would result from the reopening of the reactors. The Court 
held that the mere risk of an accident is not an effect on the physical 
environment within the meaning of NEP A.82 
In Metropolitan Edison, the Court. focused on the causal chain 
between the primary effect of a federal action on the environment 
and the alleged secondary effects. 83 Finding that evaluation of the 
effects of mere risk exceeds the scope of NEP A, the Court held that 
a reasonably close causal relationship must exist between an actual 
change in the physical environment and the effect at issue before an 
EIS examining the effect is required under NEPA.84 The Court 
defined the parameters of the causal relationship required for a 
secondary effect to be included in an EIS as being similar to the tort 
law doctrine of proximate cause. 85 Finally, the Court suggested that 
the policies and legislative intent underlying NEP A should guide 
agencies in drawing the line between effects requiring an EIS and 
those too causally attenuated to be considered under NEP A.86 
Although the Metropolitan Edison decision limits the number of 
situations in which an EIS is required, the Court said nothing about 
when an agency may use its discretion to protect the environment 
by applying its full environmental powers under NEP A. More im-
portantly, the Court's guidelines remain extremely broad and vague, 
80 460 U.s. 766 (1983). 
81 See id. at 769, 779. 
82 See id. at 775. 
83 See id. at 775-76. 
84 See id. at 774. 
85 I d. Perhaps the best statement of proximate causation was made by Judge Cardozo in 
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928): "The risk 
reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk 
to another or to anothers within the range of apprehension. " 
The gist of this statement is that an actor will be held liable for the reasonably foreseeable 
results of his or her actions. Proximate causation thus provides a limited basis of liability for 
cause-effect relationships. If the effect is a reasonably foreseeable result of a primary envi-
ronmental effect, the Supreme Court stated in Metropolitan Edison, the agency will be 
required to gauge those effects in its EIS. See 460 U.S. at 774. 
86 Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. at 774 & n.7. 
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and need to be refined so that agencies and courts can apply NEP A 
consistently. For example, the "proximately related" test the Court 
refers to must be defined more narrowly in order for agencies to 
apply the test meaningfully.87 In addition, by incorporating NEPA's 
policies within its test, the Court has made the test as broad as the 
sweeping scope of the language and intent of NEP A. 88 
III. THE CORPS'S ENABLING STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
Although all federal agencies, including the Corps, must comply 
with NEP A,89 specific jurisdiction over most wetlands development 
has devolved to the Corps through the Clean Water Act. 90 Since the 
advent of NEPA, the Corps has broadened its definition of wetlands, 
thus effectively increasing its control over wetlands permitting. 91 
NEPA applies whenever a federal agency undertakes a "major Fed-
eral action" that may have a significant impact on the environment. 92 
The United States Army Corps of Engineers administers the Section 
404 wetlands permitting program, which controls the development 
of certain wetlands. 93 Because a Corps decision to allow a wetlands 
fill permit directly and often significantly affects the human environ-
ment, Corps decisions often must run the gauntlet of NEPA. 
The Corps's control over wetlands development has led to consid-
erable litigation. 94 This litigation results both from the Corps's failure 
87 By seeking to bring the doctrine of probable cause into the conflict, the Court drew few 
bright lines that can be used to guide an agency in conforming to NEPA's requirements. 
Prosser notes: "'Proximate cause,' in short, has been an extraordinarily changeable concept. 
'Having no integrated meaning of its own, its chameleon quality permits it to be substituted 
for anyone of the elements of a negligence case when decision on that element becomes 
difficult .... No other formula ... so nearly does the work of Aladdin's lamp.'" W. PROSSER 
& w. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, ch. 7, at 276 (5th ed. 1984) (quoting Green, Proximate 
Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEX. L. REV. 471, 471 (1950». 
88 By next referring to the policy of NEPA in defining its test of a reasonably close causal 
connection, the Court brought a tremendously broad policy to bear on the test. See supra 
notes 29-46 and accompanying text. 
88 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). All federal agencies are required to fulfill 
NEPA's requirements whenever those agencies are involved in a major federal action signif-
icantly affecting the human environment. [d. 
90 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
91 See supra text accompanying notes 114-20 for discussion of the effects of the Corps's 
broadened definition of wetlands. 
92 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
93 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
94 See infra notes 236-81 for case law discussing the Corps's administration of the Section 
404 program. 
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to fulfill its duties to prepare an EIS95 and from the Corps's over-
reaching to protect the environment. 96 Controversy has arisen over 
the expanding control of the Corps over wetlands permitting, Su-
preme Court acceptance of that expansion, and the appropriateness 
of the scope of Corps regulations in light of the enabling statutes. 97 
A. Corps Enabling Statutes 
Section 404 authorizes the Corps to issue regulations for the wet-
lands permitting process. 98 Section 404(b) requires that guidelines 
established under Section 404 be based upon criteria set out in 
Section 403(b) of the CWA, which establishes standards for ocean 
dumping permits. 99 Section 403(b) requires the Corps to consider 
pollutant disposal effects on aesthetic, recreation, and economic val-
ues.100 Pollutants, as defined in the CWA, include virtually any fill 
material. 101 
By cross-reference to Section 403,102 Section 404 explicitly empow-
ers the Corps to issue regulations103 for the evaluation of such sec-
ondary effects as aesthetics, recreation, and economics in its wet-
lands permitting process. 104 Supplementing this discretion, the 
Supreme Court has recognized the power of an administrative 
agency both to administer a congressionally created program and to 
make rules to fill implied or express gaps in enabling legislation. 105 
The language of Section 404, because it leaves much of the formu-
lation of regulatory details to be determined by the Corps, empowers 
the Corps to fill the substantive gaps in the statute. 
95 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868 (1st Cir. 1985); Hough v. Marsh, 557 F. 
Supp. 74 (D. Mass. 1982). 
96 See, e.g., Mall Properties, Inc. v. Marsh, 672 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass. 1987), appeal 
dismissed, 841 F.2d 440 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 128 (1988). 
97 See generally DeVoe, Army Corps of Engineers Jurisdiction Over Wetlands Under 
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 13 
ECOLOGY L. Q. 579 (1986); Trichka, An Affirmation of Section 404 Jurisdiction Over Wetlands: 
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 30 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 257 
(1986); Comment, The Supreme Court Endorses a Broad Reading of Corps Wetland Juris-
diction Under FWPCA § 404, 16 Envtl L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,008 (1986). 
98 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
99 [d. § 1343(c). 
100 [d. § 1343(c)(i)(C). 
101 [d. § 1362(6). 
102 [d. § 1343(c). 
103 [d. § 1344(b). 
104 [d. § 1343(c)(i)(C). 
105 See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199,231 (1974). 
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B. Corps Regulations 
In formulating this regulatory detail, the Corps describes its reg-
ulatory program as concerned with the overall public interest. 106 The 
Corps's PIR process works by balancing the favorable effects of a 
proposal against its detrimental impacts. 107 This process is designed 
to reflect national policy by securing both the protection and utili-
zation of environmental resources. 108 
The PIR is designed to allow the Corps to consider both the 
probable immediate and cumulative impacts of a proposed project 
on the public interest.109 The PIR requires weighing of all factors 
relevant to each particular case. These factors include conservation 
issues, general environmental concerns, land use, floodplain values, 
economics, and the needs and welfare of the public. 110 The breadth 
of the language of these regulations has caused controversy, both 
over the expanding role of the Corps in wetlands permitting, and 
the Corps's interpretation of their regulations in light of their en-
abling statute. 111 
The scope of the Corps's PIR process corresponds with the 
breadth of NEPA.112 Both Corps regulations and NEPA look at the 
cumulative effects of an action that significantly affects the environ-
ment, and each requires the weighing of a broad range of relevant 
factors. Corps regulations are thus in tune with the nation's envi-
ronmental policy as expressed in NEP A.113 
The breadth of the Corps's regulations withstood a developer's 
challenge in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. 114 
There, the Supreme Court upheld Corps jurisdiction over freshwater 
wetlands under Section 404. 115 In Riverside, the Corps required the 
defendant developer to apply for a Section 404 permit before filling 
a freshwater wetland. 116 The Court considered whether requiring 
the permit exceeded Corps jurisdiction under Section 404 because 
this type of wetland-a freshwater wetland adjacent to a navigable 
106 33 C.F.R. § 320.l(a) (1988). 
\07 I d. § 320.4(a). 
\08 I d. § 320.1(a). 
109 I d. § 320.4(a). 
llO I d. § 320.4(a)(3). 
III See supra note 97. 
ll2 The broad language and policies of NEP A are discussed at supra notes 29-46 and 
accompanying text. 
ll3 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) with 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (1988). 
ll4 474 U.S. 121 (1985). 
ll5 I d. at 139. 
ll6 I d. at 124. 
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waterway-had been excluded from Corps jurisdiction until 1975 
amendments to Corps regulations.117 In effect, the developer was 
challenging the Corps's interpretation of Section 404 by claiming 
that Corps regulations applied the enabling statute too broadly. 
The Court, in holding against the developer, emphasized Section 
404's general purpose of protecting aquatic ecosystems and wet-
lands. 118 In granting broad discretion to the Corps to interpret and 
implement Section 404, the Court stressed congressional intent over 
narrow statutory language. 119 The Supreme Court's ratification of 
broader Corps jurisdiction under Section 404 implies that, even out-
side of NEPA-based considerations, courts should defer to Corps 
regulations when those regulations act to further the attainment of 
congressional goals. 120 
C. Corps/EPA Conflicts 
In addition to the Riverside decision, the fact that the Corps's 
wetlands decisions are subject to administrative review by the EPA 
also influences the Corps's authority pursuant to Section 404. 121 Be-
cause the EPA has shown the willingness to overturn Corps 
permits122 when the Corps has not complied with the EPA's "prac-
ticable alternatives" test,123 it follows that the Corps's full compliance 
with EPA regulations will avoid EPA review of Corps decisions and 
accompanying time delays. 
The chief area of conflict between the EPA and the Corps has 
been in the "practicable-alternatives" test required under EPA reg-
ulations. l24 This two-part test disallows a fill permit if a practicable 
117 I d. at 125-26. 
118 See id. at 138--39. 
119Id. at 137--39. 
12°ld. at 131 (citing Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 
U.S. 116, 125 (1985); Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842-45 (1984)). 
121 Section 404(c) authorizes the Administrator of the EPA to veto any permit if discharge 
at that site may cause an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish 
beds, and fishing areas, as well as on wildlife or recreational areas. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1982 
& Supp. V 1987). 
122 See, e.g., Bersani v. EPA, 674 F. Supp. 405 (N.D.N.Y. 1987); see also Liebesman, The 
Role of EPA's Guidelines in the Clean Water Act §.!,O4 Permit Programr--.!udicial Interpre-
tation and Administrative Application, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,272 (1984); 
Comment, EPA's Evolving Role in Wetlands Protection: Elaboration in Bersani v. U.S. 
EPA, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,479 (1988). 
123 Steinberg & Dowd, Economic Considerations in the Section'!'o4 Wetland Permit Process, 
7 VA. J. NAT. RES. L. 277, 280 n.2 (1988) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 (1987)). 
124 See id. at 293,280 n.2 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 (1987)). 
662 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 17:647 
alternative to a wetlands development site is available. 125 The first 
part of the practicable-alternatives test requires an economic feasi-
bility analysis of each alternative site. 126 The federal agency over-
seeing the permitting process must evaluate the logistical aspects of 
a non-wetlands site that will fulfill the developer's objectives, and 
may not grant a wetlands fill permit if a feasible upland127 site 
exists. 128 The second part of the test involves a rebuttable presump-
tion that a non-water-dependent development has a practicable al-
ternative. 129 The EPA has been far stricter than the Corps in apply-
ing this test, thus enhancing the likelihood that EPA will exercise 
its administrative veto. 130 
In Bersani v. EPA,l3l the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of N ew York upheld an EPA decision to overturn 
a Corps permit. 132 The Corps had granted a permit to a mall devel-
oper to fill a substantial amount of wetlands, finding that no practic-
able alternative site was available. 133 The only alternate site under 
consideration was inferiorly situated, with poor access and lower 
traffic counts than the proposed site. 134 The alternate site also was 
controlled by a competitive mall developer at the time of permit 
application. 135 The EPA exercised its veto power over the Corps 
because it read the rebuttable presumption in the practicable-alter-
natives test broadly. 136 The EPA found that the alternate site was a 
practicable alternative because it had been available when the de-
veloper had initiated site selection for the mall. 137 
In its decision, the Bersani court analyzed the CWA, its legislative 
history, and the EPA regulations promulgated under the statute, 
and found that the EPA had broad discretion in interpreting the 
statute. 138 By granting the EPA this broad discretion, and affirming 
125 [d. at 281. 
126 [d. 
127 Non-wetlands areas are normally referred to as upland sites. 
128 Steinberg & Dowd, supra note 123, at 281. 
129 See id. 
130 [d. at 297. 
131 674 F. Supp. 405 (N.D.N.Y. 1987). 
132 See id. at 415. 
133 [d. 
134 See id. at 410. 
135 [d. 
136 See id. at 415. 
137 [d. at 411. 
138 [d. at 408-09, 415. One commentator has noted that: "EPA's broad discretion under 
Bersani in determining unacceptable adverse effects will make it difficult for applicants of all 
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the EPA's veto over the Corps, the court strengthened EPA's con-
trol over wetlands permitting. Logically, the Corps should enjoy the 
same discretion, and comply fully with EPA guidelines, to avoid time 
delays and uncertainty in the Section 404 permit process. 
Although the Bersani decision and EPA's use of its veto power 
over the Corps effectively increases the breadth of agency power 
under Section 404, the two agencies working at cross purposes limits 
the effectiveness of the program by delaying the processing of ap-
plications. The EPA's veto power motivates the Corps to avoid these 
delays by complying fully with EPA guidelines and with EPA inter-
pretations of those guidelines. To do less would engender delay, 
confusion, interagency conflict, and a perception of agency incom-
petence. 
Although the EPA primarily has invoked the practicable-alterna-
tives test to overturn Corps decisions, the Bersani court found broad 
general discretion in the EPA to interpret Section 404. 139 Because 
the Corps is jointly responsible for administration of the Section 404 
program,140 it shares with EPA this broad latitude in interpreting 
its regulations to further the goals of Section 404. 
The Corps therefore must comply with EPA regulations,141 its 
own regulations, 142 and the comprehensive and supplemental overlay 
provided by NEPA.143 Corps regulations thus reflect, but are not 
necessarily the sole source of, the environmental policy of the nation 
in all of its comprehensive breadth. 
The Supreme Court's ratification of Corps regulations in United 
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. 144 indicates that Corps 
regulations, broadly drafted to serve a goal of wetlands protection, 
will not quickly be construed as exceeding statutory authority. Corps 
regulations have responded to the congressional mandate of 
NEP A,145 as well as judicial decisions supporting broadened Corps 
types of projects to know whether or not their proposals will be deemed to affect the envi-
ronment in an unacceptable manner until late in the permit process. The Bersani decision, 
therefore, creates more uncertainty in the wetlands permit process than has ever existed 
before." Steinberg & Dowd, supra note 123, at 297. 
139 674 F. Supp. at 415. 
140 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
141 40 C.F.R. § 230 (1988). 
142 33 C.F.R. §§ 320, 323, 325, 328 (1988). 
143 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
144 See 474 U.S. 121, 135 (1985); see also supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text. 
145 33 C.F.R. § 320.3(d) (1988) acknowledges NEPA and recognizes the national policy of 
NEPA as applying to the Corps. 
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jurisdiction over wetlands development. 146 Consequently, courts gen-
erally should defer to the Corps's wetlands permitting decisions. 
The undefined power springing from NEP A and mirrored in Corps 
regulations clearly requires some limitation, both to allow acceptable 
development and to preserve agency resources. To achieve such a 
balance requires addressing the issue of when social, economic, and 
other secondary factors may be considered under Corps regulations 
without exceeding the delegation of regulatory powers to the Corps. 
Clearly, some nexus between the social, economic, and other factors 
involved and the immediate environmental significance of a proposed 
action must be defined. 147 
IV. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO AGENCY DECISIONS 
As illustrated in Metropolitan Edison, agency action is subject to 
judicial review for compliance with NEPA.148 The ability of agencies 
to comply with the hazy test set forth in Metropolitan Edison ulti-
mately will be judged by federal courts. Judicial review of agency 
action is subject, however, to the judicial review provisions of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) , 149 which prevent courts in 
many instances from overturning agency actions that are at least 
arguably "correct." 
Despite the narrow holding in Metropolitan Edison, courts fre-
quently intervene in NEPA-related agency actions. 15o Although the 
AP A places limits on judicial review of agency action,151 considera-
tion of relevant provisions of the AP A will help to delimit the prac-
tical range of freedom actually granted to the Corps by NEP A and 
Section 404. The Act provides that a court may set aside agency 
146 See supra notes 114-120 and accompanying text. 
147 In its permitting process, the Corps weighs the positive and negative effects of a wetlands 
fill permit. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (1988). Naturally, allowing the Corps to consider all possible 
effects of a permit, no matter how indirectly causally related, will tip the scales against 
development, because policy objections, psychological aversion to a project, and other minutiae 
would enter into the equation. Likewise, if the Corps is allowed to consider only the most 
direct primary effects of a project, developers would benefit, often at the expense of wetlands. 
Somewhere in between these extremes lies the optimal level. At this level, the Corps would 
not stifle all development, but would be empowered to assess the actual overall environmental 
costs of a project. 
148 See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text. 
149 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
150 See, e.g. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 825 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 
908 (1973); Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1978). See generally Shea, The Judicial 
Standard for Review of Environmental Impact Statement Threshold Decisions, 9 B. C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 63 (1980). 
151 5 U.S.C §§ 701-706 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
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actions that are arbitrary and capricious, in excess of statutory 
authority, or in violation of statutory procedure. 152 
Court decisions applying the AP A have further defined when a 
court may overturn an agency action. Hanly v. Kleindienst153 in-
volved judicial review of an agency threshold determination of 
whether or not to prepare an EIS.154 In Hanly, residents opposing 
a jail proposed for the Manhattan Civic Center sought judicial review 
of a General Services Administration (GSA) decision that the pro-
posed project did not require an EIS.155 The GSA had stated that 
the project threatened no significant impact on the quality of the 
human environment. 156 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in 
holding for the GSA, described judicial review procedures for NEP A 
actions. 157 The court held that the agency in charge of the proposed 
federal action is authorized to determine whether the action requires 
an EIS.158 The court felt that Congress was willing to depend on an 
agency's good-faith determination of the need for an EIS.159 
The Hanly court also interpreted the congressional intent behind 
the words "actions significantly affecting the human environment. "160 
"Significantly," according to the court, involves consideration of two 
factors: (1) the increment in adverse environmental effects caused 
by the project in excess of those caused by pre-existing uses and (2) 
the absolute cumulative effects of the project.161 As a result, the 
court demanded consideration of a broad range of factors by an 
agency making a threshold decision determining whether an EIS 
was required. 
The Hanly court held that the standard of judicial review depends 
on whether a court is presented with question of fact or of law. 162 
According to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, questions of fact 
are to be evaluated by the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, 163 
while questions of law are subject to a de novo review by the re-
152 [d. § 706(2). 
153 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). 
154 See id. at 826. 
155 [d. 
156 See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1982 & Supp. V 1987». 
15' [d. at 828-30. 
158 See id. at 828. 
159 [d. at 830. 
160 See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1982 & Supp. V 1987». 
161 See id. 
162 See id. at 828. 
163 [d. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1982 & Supp. V 1987». 
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viewing court.164 If, however, a question of law lies within agency 
expertise, a court may defer to that expertise and decide not to 
institute a de novo review. 165 
The Hanly court further held that a "rational basis" test is used 
for mixed questions of law and fact. 166 An agency's decision will be 
upheld when it has "warrant in the record" and a "reasonable basis 
in law. "167 Finally, the court concluded that the standard of review 
for agency threshold decisions on EIS preparation is the "arbitrary 
and capricious" standard, to take advantage of agency expertise. l68 
This broad judicial deference to agency actions in NEPA-related 
situations was further delineated in Karlen v. Harris. 169 There, the 
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) recommended constructing a low-income apartment building 
on a specified site. 170 An alternate site that could have greatly less-
ened the detrimental social and economic effects of the project was 
available. l7l HUD cited a two-year delay connected with the argua-
bly superior site as the reason for selecting the inferior site.172 In 
overturning HUD's decision and enjoining construction of the build-
ing on the inferior site, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals adopted 
a dual judicial review standard for use in NEPA cases. 173 First, the 
court applied the arbitrary and capricious standard as required by 
the APA.174 In addition, however, the court held that the provisions 
of NEPA should provide substantive standards for use in reviewing 
the merits of agency decisions.175 As a result of Karlen, then, the 
Second Circuit refers to NEPA's policies in determining whether an 
agency's action is arbitrary and capricious. 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. 176 provides additional guidance as to the proper 
scope of judicial review of NEPA-related agency decisions. There, a 
lower court reviewed the AEC's promulgation of regulations re-
164 I d. at 830. 
165 I d. at 829. 
1661d. 
1671d. (quoting NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944)). 
168 I d. at 830. 
169 590 F.2d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1978). 
170 I d. at 42. 
171 See id. 
172 See id. 
173 See id. at 43. 
1741d. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976)). 
1751d. 
176 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978). 
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garding fuel cycling at an atomic energy plant. 177 The Supreme Court 
reversed the lower court and stated that NEP A establishes signifi-
cant substantive goals for the United States, but imposes essentially 
procedural duties upon agencies. 178 The Court limited judicial inter-
ference in NEPA-based agency decisions by holding that NEPA is 
designed to insure a fully informed and well-considered decision by 
an agency, and does not contemplate judges sUbstituting the deci-
sions they would have made for those made at the agency level. 179 
Perhaps the clearest statement of this policy of judicial deference 
is Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 180 in which the Sierra Club sought to require 
coal companies to prepare a comprehensive regional EIS to deter-
mine the effects of coal mining activities instead of the individual, 
project-by-project EIS required by the Department of the Inte-
rior. 181 In upholding the Department of the Interior's decision, the 
Court held that neither the language nor the legislative history of 
NEP A contemplated that a court should substitute its own judgment 
for an agency's judgment as to the environmental effects of its 
actions. 182 Instead, courts are limited to ensuring that an agency has 
taken a "hard look" at the environmental consequences. 183 The court 
cannot "interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive 
as to the choice of the action to be taken."l84 
It is clear from these decisions that a federal agency decision 
should be granted a broad amount of deference, both generally under 
the AP A and specifically under NEP A. Courts are concerned with 
ensuring that agencies take environmental considerations into ac-
count. Thus, as long as an agency has scrutinized NEPA's environ-
mental considerations, a court should not interfere, even if the court 
disagrees with the agency's decision. 
Addressing the range of factors that an agency must consider in 
order to withstand this standard of review, the Supreme Court has 
held that an agency acts arbitrarily and capriciously if it fails to take 
all relevant factors into account. 185 The court in Hanly v. Mitchell 186 
relied on this rationale, enjoining construction of a courthouse annex 
177 See id. at 535. 
178 See id. at 558. 
179Id. 
180 427 U.S. 390 (1976). 
181 See id. at 395. 
182 I d. at 410 n.21. 
183Id. 
184Id. (quoting NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). 
185 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
186 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972). 
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until the GSA, the federal agency in charge, compiled an EIS con-
sidering all relevant environmental factors.187 The Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Hanly defined the range of factors broadly: 
[NEPAl contains no exhaustive list of so-called "environmental 
considerations" but without question its aims extend beyond 
sewage and garbage and even beyond water and air pollution 
. . . . The Act must be construed to include protection of the 
quality of life for city residents. Noise, traffic, over-burdened 
mass transportalA'on systems, crime, congestion and even avail-
ability of drugs all affect the "urban environment" and are surely 
results of the "profound influence of . . . 'high density urbani-
zation' and industrial expansion. "188 
Hanly shows that courts are willing to overturn agency actions when 
those agencies have not complied with the spirit of NEP A by con-
sidering a broad range of environmental factors. If federal agencies 
refuse to exercise their discretion to accomplish NEPA's broad goals, 
the judiciary may intervene and force agencies to consider a broad 
array of environmental factors in their decisionmaking processes. 
V. CONSIDERATION OF SECONDARY SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
EFFECTS IN NEPA-RELATED CASE LAW 
Commentators have frequently analyzed courts' attempts to de-
termine whether agency consideration or lack of consideration of 
secondary social and economic factors is appropriate in light of 
NEPA.189 Holdings in this area have been inconsistent190 and courts 
have yet to provide reliable guidance for the Corps. Corps decisions 
have been remanded, both for considering and failing to consider, 
various factors. 191 Nevertheless, NEPA-related case law involving a 
variety of federal agencies, including the Corps, has advanced prin-
187 See id. at 648. 
188 Id. at 647 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1982 & Supp. v 1987)). 
189 See generally Fix, Addressing the Issue of the Economic Impact of Regional Malls in 
Legal Proceedings, 20 URB. L. ANN. 101 (1980); Caprio, The Role of Secondary Impacts 
Under NEPA, 6 ENVTL. AFF. 127 (1977); Note, Como-Falcon v. Dept. of Labor: The Role of 
Public Hearings and Socio-Economic Impacts in Determining Whether NEPA Requires an 
EIS, 6 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 165 (1980); Comment, Socioeconomic Impacts and the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 64 GEO. L. J. 1121 (1976). 
190 See, e.g., Mall Properties, Inc. v. Marsh, 672 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass. 1987), appeal 
dismissed, 841 F.2d 440 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 128 (1988) (prohibiting the Corps 
from considering secondary social and economic effects of a proposed mall project). But cf. 
Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868 (1st Cir. 1985) (remanding a challenged permit application 
to the Corps and requiring the Corps to weigh secondary social and economic factors in its 
EIS). 
191 See generally Steinberg & Dowd, supra note 123, at 298~05. 
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ciples which may clarify the extent to which an agency can consider 
secondary effects. 
A. Consideration of Secondary Factors by Federal Agencies 
A key limitation to agency action in NEPA situations was delin-
eated in Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA.192 The EPA 
had adopted new regulations reflecting the interaction between the 
CWA and NEP A. 193 Although the court agreed that NEP A autho-
rized an agency to consider environmental factors not expressly 
enumerated in the agency's enabling legislation,194 the court struck 
down as overbroad an EPA regulation that empowered the EPA to 
regulate point sources of pollution discharge. 195 The CWA authorizes 
the EPA only to allow, prohibit, or condition pollutant discharge, 
not to regulate point sources. 196 The court distinguished between 
actions taken by a federal agency, which are strictly controlled by 
enabling statutes, and the factors that the agency may evaluate when 
engaging in that action. 197 Consequently, NEPA may act to broaden 
the range of the latter, but may not alter the procedural duties of 
the agency under its enabling statute. 198 
NRDC v. EPA limits the end results of an agency action to those 
explicitly provided by an agency's enabling legislation. 199 Courts 
have granted more latitude to agencies in the range of factors that 
an agency may evaluate in coming to that end result. For instance, 
in City of Rochester v. United States Postal Service , 200 the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals required the postal service to prepare an 
EIS evaluating the impacts of a proposed relocation of a large mail 
facility from a downtown area to a neighboring suburb. 201 Citing 
192 57 U.S.L.W. 2185 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 20, 1988). 
193Id. The EPA's updated regulations are compiled at 40 C.F.R. § 123.44(c)(6) (1988). 
194 See NRDC v. EPA, 57 U.S.L.W. at 2186. 
195 See id. The court held that the EPA's regulation, 40 C.F.R. § 123(c)(6) could not be 
supported by NEPA. NRDC v. EPA, 57 U.S.L.W. at 2186. 
196 33 U.S.C. § 511(c)(i) (1982). 
197 See NRDC v. EPA, 57 U.S.L.W. at 2186. 
198 See id. By analogy, NRDC v. EPA limits the procedural duties and powers of an agency. 
For example, the Corps may either grant or deny a wetlands fill permit under Section 404. 
Granting or denying the permit is the "end" result of the Corps permitting process. Under 
NRDC v. EPA the Corps may not exceed its Section 404 procedural duty by attempting to 
regulate landfills. The Corps can, however, under NRDC v. EPA, utilize a broad range of 
"means" to arrive at its decision. "Means" include the factors the Corps examines in its public 
interest review (PIR) process as it evaluates the effects of a permit decision. 
199 See id. 
200 541 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1976). 
201 I d. at 978. 
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CEQ regulations that require the cumulative effects of a major 
federal action to be evaluated in the EIS threshold decision,202 the 
court required the postal service to consider a broad range of possible 
effects of its proposed move. 203 The possible effects to be evaluated 
were virtually all social and economic, including: (1) increased vehic-
ular traffic; (2) loss of inner-city jobs and job opportunities; (3) pos-
sible economic and physical deterioration of the downtown area; and 
(4) the impact of abandonment of the old facility or the possibility of 
further downtown blight. 204 
On its face, City of Rochester seems to be irreconcilable with 
Image of Greater San Antonio, Texas v. Brown.205 In the latter case, 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to require the United 
States Air Force to prepare an EIS considering possible socioeco-
nomic damage to the local community as a result of an Air Force 
decision to eliminate a number of civilian positions at an air base. 206 
The cases can, however, easily be distinguished on their facts. In 
San Antonio, the plaintiffs did not allege a primary effect on the 
physical environment, referring instead only to the social and eco-
nomic effects on the discharged employees. 207 The court in San An-
tonio limited its holding, stating that, given a primary impact on the 
natural environment, secondary socioeconomic effects may then also 
be considered. 208 Without that primary impact, no EIS need be 
prepared. 209 Conversely, in City of Rochester, the proposed move 
affected the physical environment, and the opponents of the move 
did allege that effect.210 Because of this primary environmental ef-
fect, the Postal Service was required to evaluate secondary effects. 211 
In McDowell v. Schlesinger,212 the United States District Court 
for the District of Missouri reached a result contrary to that reached 
in San Antonio. In McDowell, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
was required to prepare an EIS on a proposed move of 7500 persons 
202 [d. at 972 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(a) (1975». 
203 [d. at 978. 
204 [d. at 973-74; see also Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 
1975) (requiring Department of Housing and Urban Development to consider the impact of 
its actions on urban decay, blight, and city development planning in an ErS). 
205 570 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1978). 
206 See id. at 518. 
207 See id. at 522. 
208 [d. (citing Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972»; 
40 C.F.R. § 1500.8(a)(3)(ii) (1975). 
209 San Antonio, 570 F.2d at 522. 
210 City of Rochester v. United States Postal Serv., 541 F.2d 967, 973 (2d Cir. 1976). 
211 See id. at 978. 
212 404 F. Supp. 221 (W.D. Mo. 1975). 
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from one military base to another.213 Impacts to be considered in the 
EIS included effects on social and economic conditions and activities 
in the area, development and growth patterns for the area, neigh-
borhood character and cohesiveness, and aesthetic considerations. 214 
The DOD was required to consider effects on both the abandoned 
area and the transfer location.215 The court in M eDowell emphasized 
not only the extraordinary breadth of NEP A, but also the fact that 
NEPA's policies had in effect been internalized in DOD regula-
tions. 216 By not preparing an EIS evaluating the cumulative primary 
and secondary effects of its proposal, the DOD had strayed both 
from the spirit of NEPA and from its own regulations, and was 
forced to comply with both in its decisionmaking process. 217 
Conversely, in Dalsis v. Hills,218 the proprietor of a downtown 
store sought an injunction against construction of a shopping mall, 
alleging that the construction would cause blight and deterioration 
of the central business district. 219 The plaintiff alleged that the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) had not com-
plied with NEP A because it failed to consider increased traffic 
congestion and possible urban decay in reaching its decision that an 
EIS was not required. 220 The court applied the APA's arbitrary and 
capricious standard of judicial review, 221 and found that, because 
HUD's economic analysis of the proposal was comprehensive, HUD's 
decision was therefore not arbitrary or capricious. 222 
An agency's decision not to prepare an EIS was likewise upheld 
in Olmsted Citizens for a Better Community v. United States. 223 In 
213 See id. at 254. 
214 [d. 
215 See id. 
216 See id. at 244-46 (citing 32 C.F.R. § 214 (1974». 
217 See id. at 246. 
218 424 F. Supp. 784 (W.D.N.Y. 1976). 
219 [d. at 786. 
220 [d. 
221 [d. at 789 (citing Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 
U.S. 908 (1973». 
222 See id. at 790-91. The court emphasized that HUD had considered the possibility of 
downtown store closings and resulting urban decay due to the mall, and had concluded that 
although some detrimental results might occur, the marginal businesses in question may have 
had to close even without the mall. [d. at 790. In addition, the court remarked that "[t]he 
mall would not differ substantially from the makeup of the down-town commercial area and 
it would not in absolute terms give rise to sizeable adverse environmental effects." [d. at 791. 
Finally, the court pointed out that there were no primary environmental effects arising from 
actual construction of the proposed mall, and that the harms claimed were limited and merely 
potential. See id. at 792. 
223 793 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1986). 
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Olmsted, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a district court 
decision that the proposed conversion of a former state mental hos-
pital into a federal prison hospital did not require preparation of an 
EIS.224 This case, like Metropolitan Edison,225 involved a citizens' 
group fighting against a federal action primarily because of fears 
about the social and economic results of the action. 226 
Holding that the possible effects of the jail conversion, such as 
introduction of drugs and weapons, crime, and a decrease or halt in 
neighborhood development, are the result of social and not physical 
environmental changes, the Olmsted court stated that an impact 
statement is needed only when the federal action threatens the 
physical resources of the area.227 The court included traffic changes, 
population concentration changes, water supply problems, and the 
irreversible alterations of rare sites in its list of physical impacts 
that might require preparation of an EIS.228 
Olmsted provides an example of how secondary social and eco-
nomic effects will not suffice to trigger the need for an EIS in the 
absence of a significant primary environmental impact. Like the 
Supreme Court in Metropolitan Edison,229 the Olmsted court noted 
that NEPA was designed only to protect the environment, and, 
although sweeping in scope, NEP A does not require preparation of 
an EIS when opponents voice general policy objections to proposed 
federal actions. 230 
These cases, although factually distinguishable, clearly adhere to 
some basic principles applicable to a determination of whether an 
agency should account for secondary socioeconomic effects in decid-
ing whether to prepare an EIS. Clearly, an agency must adhere 
strictly to the procedural mandates of its enabling statute, although 
NEPA's policies may be considered in the decisionmaking process.231 
Also, it is clear that some primary environmental effect must exist 
in order to trigger the preparation of an EIS,232 but that, once the 
224 I d. at 203. 
225 See supm notes 80-88 and accompanying text. 
226 793 F.2d at 204, 205. 
227 See id. at 205 (citing Azzolina v. United States Postal Serv., 602 F. Supp. 859, 863 
(D. N.J. 1985)). In Olmsted, the major primary effects sought to be avoided were the social 
changes of the prison conversion, and social impacts alone rarely constitute enough of a primary 
impact to trigger the EIS requirement. See id. 
228 Id. 
229 See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text. 
230 793 F.2d at 204. 
231 See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 57 U.S.L.W. 2185, 2186 (D.C. Cir. 1986); 
see also supm notes 192-99 and accompanying text. 
232 See Olmsted, 793 F.2d at 204; see also supra notes 223-30 and accompanying text. 
1990] WETLANDS PERMITTING 673 
EIS is required, secondary factors may be considered.233 Likewise, 
internalization of NEPA policies in agency regulations crystallizes 
NEP A's vague substantive requirements. Once NEPA's policies 
have been included in an agency's regulations, the agency involved 
must consider a broad range of primary and secondary effects in 
making its decisions. 234 Finally, mere policy objections will not suffice 
to require preparation of an EIS absent significant primary effects. 235 
B. Consideration of Secondary Social and Economic Effects by 
the Corps 
Case law dealing with the consideration of secondary factors by 
the Corps in its Section 404 permitting process has likewise been far 
from consistent. For instance, in Hough v. Marsh,236 two individuals 
sought approval to build two private residences and a tennis court 
on a three-acre parcel of land abutting Edgartown Harbor on Mar-
tha's Vineyard. 237 Because the proposal required filling one quarter 
acre of wetlands, it required a Section 404 permit. 238 
After the Corps published public notice of the permit applica-
tion,239 it received considerable public opposition to the proj ect. 240 
Three interested federal agencies whose opinions were solicited by 
the Corps were split on the permit decision. 241 The EPA recom-
mended that the permit be issued, finding no permanent unaccept-
able disruption to the aquatic ecosystems involved.242 The National 
233 See City of Rochester v. United States Postal Serv., 541 F.2d 967, 973 (2d Cir. 1976); 
see also supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text. 
234 See McDowell v. Schlesinger, 404 F. Supp. 221, 245-46 (W.D. Mo. 1975); see also supra 
notes 212-17 and accompanying text. 
235 See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 777-78 
(1983); see also supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text. 
236 557 F. Supp. 74 (D. Mass. 1982). 
237 I d. at 76. 
238 I d. Although the defendants had gotten approval from the Massachusetts Department 
of Environmental Quality Engineering and had begun to fill the wetlands, the Corps intervened 
by serving them with a cease and desist order under Section 404. Id. at 77. 
239 Regulations require the Corps to publish a public notice of all permit applications. 33 
C.F.R. §§ 325.2(2), 325.3 (1988). Comments received in response to this public notice must 
be acknowledged by the Corps, and made part of the administrative record of the application. 
Id. § 325.2(3). The applicant is given the opportunity to offer his views on substantive 
comments received during this phase. Id. The District Engineer then determines, based on 
the administrative record, whether the permit should be granted. Id. § 325.2(6). 
240 After providing public notice of the permit application, the Corps received 259 letters 
opposing the project, and only one letter in favor of the project from the public. Hough, 557 
F. Supp. at 77. 
241Id. 
242Id. 
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Marine Fisheries Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service each 
recommended denial of the permit because of the long-term effects 
on the ecosystem. 243 The Corps decided to issue the permit, conclud-
ing that the applicants' right to use their property for residential 
purposes overrode the minimal impact of the development on the 
environment.244 The plaintiffs sought judicial review of this decision 
on the grounds that the Corps had failed in its public interest review 
to give adequate consideration to several relevant factors required 
to be considered under Corps regulations. 245 
In remanding the matter to the Corps, the Hough court empha-
sized several inadequacies in the Corps's decisionmaking process. 246 
Although the Corps did consider some economic factors in its review, 
it did not consider the economic effect of the elimination of the view 
of a scenic lighthouse that was on the itinerary of sightseeing 
buses. 247 The court held that this failure to consider economic impacts 
on the tourism industry violated Corps regulations, which require 
consideration of all economic factors. 248 
In addition, the Corps had not looked at the cumulative effects of 
the proposal in relation to already existing and anticipated projects, 
opting instead to look at each proposal in isolation. 249 The court 
remanded for comprehensive consideration of such cumulative ef-
fects in light of Corps regulations. 250 
A similar result was reached in Sierra Club v. Marsh,251 in which 
the First Circuit Court of Appeals required the Corps and the Fed-
eral Highway Administration (FHA) to prepare an EIS after the 
agencies had determined that a proposal to build a cargo port and a 
243Id. 
244 Id. However, in its environmental assessment (the process whereby the Corps makes its 
threshold decision whether to prepare an EIS), the Corps did canvass an "array of environ-
mental, aesthetic, economic, historic, and other considerations." Id. The environmental as-
sessment ("EA") is a limited, preliminary investigation into the probable environmental effects 
of a project which may require an EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1988). In its Section 404 permitting 
process, the Corps files a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) if, after a preliminary 
investigation into the possible environmental effects of a wetlands fill proposal, the Corps 
official in charge determines that no significant environmental impact will occur. 40 C.F.R. 
§ 1508.13 (1988). Corps regulations implementing the CEQ guidelines on EAs and FONSIs 
are compiled at 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. B(7) (1988). 
245 Hough, 557 F. Supp. at 77. 
246Id. at 77, 86 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (1988), which requires the Corps to consider 
economic effects and cumulative impacts in its PIR). 
247 I d. at 86-88. 
248Id. at 86. 
249Id. (citing 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(2)(iv) (1988». 
25°Id. 
251 769 F.2d 868 (1st Cir. 1985). 
1990] WETLANDS PERMITTING 675 
causeway from the mainland to Sears Island, Maine, did not require 
an EIS.252 In their environmental assessment (EA), the preliminary 
report which determines the need for an EIS,253 these agencies 
decided that no EIS was needed. 254 The court viewed the agencies' 
assessment as perfunctory and incomplete. 255 Applying the arbitrary 
and capricious standard to its review of the agency actions, the court 
held that the EA was not an adequate substitute for an EIS, and 
that several vital factors had been considered only perfunctorily or 
not at all. 256 
The agencies in Sierra Club v. Marsh did examine effects on clam 
fiats, marine animals, waterfowl, seals, upland habitat, runoff of 
pollutants, limitation of tidal exchange, and the impact of dredging 
and soil disposal at an ocean dumpsite. 257 The court questioned the 
agencies' decision that these effects were not significant but that 
doubt alone did not constitute sufficient grounds to overturn the 
agencies under the arbitrary and capricious standard. 258 Rather, the 
key to the court's decision to overturn the agencies was the agencies' 
failure to consider the probable future effects of the proposal. 259 
Citing CEQ regulations requiring consideration of all reasonably 
foreseeable effects,260 the court held that the agencies violated these 
regulations by failing to properly evaluate these effects. 261 Conse-
quently, the court remanded the matter to the agencies for further 
consideration of the future effects of the project. 
Significantly, the First Circuit limited its holding by stating that 
agencies are not required to consider highly speculative or indefinite 
impacts. 262 The court further narrowed the range of reasonable fac-
tors to be considered by framing a set of questions: 
With what confidence can one say that the impacts are likely to 
occur? Can one describe them "now" with sufficient specificity 
to make their consideration useful? If the decisionmaker does 
252 See id. at 870. 
253 Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.9, 1508.17 (1984». 
254 Id. 
255 See id. at 879. 
256 See id. at 878. 
257Id. at 876-77. 
258 See id. at 877. 
259Id. 
26°Id. at 877-78 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (1984». 
261 See id. at 878. The effects in question are the possible further development of the island 
and mainland because of the project, and the possible environmental effects related to that 
further development. I d. 
262Id. (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 402 (1976». 
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not take them into account "now" will the decisionmaker be able 
to take account of them before the agency is so firmly committed 
to the project that further environmental knowledge, as a prac-
tical matter, will prove irrelevant to the government's deci-
sion?263 
Because the administrative record contained clear indications that 
further industrial development, with its accompanying environmen-
tal fallout, was quite certain to occur, the court remanded the matter 
to the agencies for consideration of these secondary factors.264 The 
court held that the effects must be considered now because a decision 
to issue the permit could commit the region to the risk of future 
related impacts. 265 
Because of the need to consider these effects, the Sierra Club 
court remanded the Section 404 permit application to the Corps, 
citing the Corps's failure to consider the cumulative, reasonably 
foreseeable secondary effects of the proposed development. 266 Con-
versely, in Mall Properties, Inc. v. Marsh,267 the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts disallowed the 
Corps's consideration of secondary social and economic factors in its 
public interest review, despite evidence that detrimental social and 
environmental effects would foreseeably result from a proposal to 
build a large suburban mall on wetlands and floodplains bordering 
the Quinnipiac River in North Haven, Connecticut, a suburb of New 
Haven. 268 
The proposed mall required the filling of approximately twenty-
five acres of wetlands, as well as some alterations to existing water-
ways.269 While evaluating the mall developer's permit application 
and preparing an EIS as required by NEPA,270 the Corps took into 
account the primary ecological effects, such as loss of floodplains, 
263 [d. (citing Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952--53 (1st Cir. 1983». 
264 [d. at 870, 878. Evidence of future development was contained in the EAs, the town's 
Municipal Response Plan, and a Land Use Plan prepared by one of the island's owners, all of 
which looked forward to future development stemming from construction of the causeway and 
port. [d. at 878-79. See also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(6) (1988), which requires consideration of 
the "degree to which the action may establish a precedent for future actions with significant 
effects." 
26fi See 769 F.2d at 879. 
266 See id. at 878. 
267 672 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass. 1987), appeal dismissed, 841 F.2d 440 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 
109 S. Ct. 128 (1988). 
268 [d. at 565. 
269 Record of Decision, Application for a Department of the Army Permit by Mall Properties, 
Inc. at 2 (Aug. 20, 1985) [hereinafter Record of Decision]. 
270 See id. at 4. 
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loss of wildlife habitat, and loss of wetlands, as well as the secondary 
social and economic effects the mall would have on downtown New 
Haven. 271 
Connecticut officials argued that the mall, if built, would create 
unemployment in downtown New Haven, cripple the downtown busi-
ness area, and seriously diminish the tax base. 272 The Corps consid-
ered these effects in its decision to deny the wetlands fill permit. 273 
The court, concluding that the secondary factors were dispositive in 
the Corps's decision,274 held that denial of the permit on those 
grounds exceeded the authority granted to the Corps in Section 404, 
and was inconsistent with the Corps's own public interest review 
regulations. 275 
In Mall Properties, the court based its decision in large part on 
the Supreme Court's decision in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People 
Against Nuclear Energy. 276 The Mall Properties court held that the 
proximate causation standard laid down in Metropolitan Edison277 
prevented the Corps from considering the secondary social and eco-
nomic effects on downtown New Haven in its PIR.278 
The court read the proximate causation standard narrowly, hold-
ing that the Corps may, during its permitting process, evaluate only 
economic effects directly related to changes in the physical environ-
ment.279 Implicitly averring that mall construction would not ad-
versely affect New Haven's environment, the court stressed that 
"[t]he statutes implicated in this case were enacted to protect the 
271Id. at 5. 
272Id. at 13; see also Mall Properties, 672 F. Supp. at 564-65. 
273 Record of Decision, supra note 269, at 47. 
274 Mall Properties, 672 F. Supp. at 565. In a preliminary Record of Decision (ROD), a 
document in which the Corps spells out its rationale for granting or denying a permit, the 
Corps District Engineer had denied the permit due to the primary environmental impacts 
alone. Only in the final draft version of the ROD were the secondary social and economic 
effects on New Haven paramount in the balancing process. This information, brought to the 
attention of the Mall Properties court by the brief filed by attorneys representing New Haven, 
shows that the secondary environmental effects were not dispositive in the decision to deny 
the permit. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit at 10-11, New Haven v. Marsh, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 128 (1988). 
275 Mall Properties, 672 F. Supp. at 566 (citing 33 C.F.R § 320.4(a) (1987); 33 U.S.C. § 1344 
(1982 & Supp. V 1987». 
276Id. at 570-71. 
277 In Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. 766 (1983), the Supreme Court held that the NRC was 
not obligated to prepare an EIS, not that the NRC had improperly considered factors too 
causally attenuated to be relevant. Thus, the fact patterns of Mall Properties and Metropolitan 
Edison are not analogous. 
278 672 F. Supp. at 571. 
279Id. at 568, 573-74. 
678 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 17:647 
natural environment," not to delineate "whether the economic inter-
ests of aging cities or their newer suburbs should as a matter of 
public policy be preferred. "280 The court emphasized the political 
battle between the cities, stating that "[t]he most important issue 
emerging from the Corps' lengthy public interest review was 
whether New Haven's interests ought to be preferred over North 
Haven's interests."281 
VI. DELINEATING THE ApPROPRIATE SCOPE OF THE CORPS'S 
WETLANDS PERMITTING PROCESS 
In its Section 404 wetlands permitting process, the Corps must, 
pursuant to its own regulations, consider a broad range of primary 
and secondary effects of a wetlands fill project.282 Conflicting deci-
sions,283 external pressure,284 and Corps inconsistency 285 have intro-
duced uncertainty in the Section 404 permitting process. N everthe-
less, relevant case law provides some principles, which, if 
consistently applied, can provide the Corps with judicial guidance as 
to the scope of its responsibilities under NEP A and Section 404. 
Obviously, most projects that require a Section 404 wetlands fill 
permit involve a significant effect on the human environment. Each 
permit granted decreases the acreage of existing wetlands, which 
provide wildlife habitat, fresh water supplies, and flood storage. 286 
This primary effect occurs each time the Corps grants a wetlands 
fill permit. 
Given that a primary impact will occur, two issues arise for the 
Corps in evaluating secondary social and economic effects. The Corps 
must first define a lower limit by determining to what extent NEP A 
and the outstanding case law require the Corps to evaluate secondary 
social and economic effects as it evaluates a wetlands fill permit 
application. Next, the Corps must set an upper limit to its con sid-
280 [d. at 573. 
281 [d. at 575. 
282 The Corps's public interest review regulation, 33 C.F.R. § 320.4 (1988), requires the 
Corps to consider "all relevant effects" of a wetlands permit. 
283 See supra notes 236-81 and accompanying text. 
284 See supra notes 121~0 and accompanying text. 
285 See generally Hough v. Marsh, 557 F. Supp. 74 (D. Mass. 1982) (requiring the Corps to 
examine a relatively minor secondary economic effect-the loss of a lighthouse view to sight-
seeing buses on Martha's Vineyard); cf. Mall Properties, 672 F. Supp. 561 (prohibiting the 
Corps from evaluating the potentially serious secondary social and economic effects of a 
wetlands fill project on downtown New Haven, Connecticut). See supra notes 236-50 for a 
discussion of Hough v. Marsh, and supra notes 267-81 for a discussion of Mall Properties. 
286 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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eration of secondary effects by defining the types and degrees of 
secondary effects that it may evaluate. The lower limit is set by 
court decisions that have forced agencies to implement NEPA's 
policies by investigating a broad array of secondary effects. The 
upper limit is delineated by case law which limits agency discretion 
to consider secondary social and economic effects. 
Analysis of the case law reveals that NEPA's broad policies, in-
teracting with the broad authority that Section 404 grants the Corps, 
set the upper limit. As such, courts should grant considerable de-
ference to any exercise of Corps discretion that advances NEPA's 
policies. 
The Supreme Court supplied the starting point for this analysis 
in Metropolitan Edison. 287 There, the Court held that secondary 
effects will require preparation of an EIS only if those secondary 
effects are proximately caused by a primary effect on the environ-
ment. 288 The Court in Metropolitan Edison therefore set the lower 
range: while making the threshold decision on whether an EIS is or 
is not required, the agency need not consider secondary effects that 
are not proximately caused by a primary effect on the environ-
ment.289 
Defining proximate causation in the NEP A/Section 404 realm is 
paramount to delineating the nexus required between primary en-
vironmental impacts and secondary socioeconomic effects before 
those secondary factors must be considered in the Section 404 per-
mitting process. Clearly, any secondary effect must be actual and 
verifiable, and not unduly speculative,290 in order to receive consid-
eration. Assuming some sufficient level of certainty that a specific 
secondary effect will be the result of a primary effect on the envi-
ronment, the issue that the Corps must address is how far it can go 
down the chain of causation to consider secondary effects increas-
ingly remote from the primary effect. 
The Supreme Court in Metropolitan Edison referred to the malle-
able concept of proximate causation as the standard for determining 
whether secondary effects were connected closely enough with a 
primary environmental effect to warrant an EIS.291 The Court did 
not, however, provide much guidance for agencies seeking to comply 
287 See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text. 
288 Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983). 
289 See id. 
290 See supra notes 153-68 and accompanying text. 
291 460 U.S. at 774. 
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with NEPA, because it referred both to NEPA's policies and to the 
malleable concept of proximate causation in its decision. 292 Nor did 
the Court actually define the scope of proximate causation. 293 With-
out further definition, the Supreme Court's holding is too broad to 
apply consistently. 
One can conclude from Metropolitan Edison that the Corps is not 
bound to research and evaluate each and every policy objection to a 
proposed wetlands fill project. Instead, only objections based on a 
potential primary effect on the environment must be evaluated. 294 
In addition, secondary factors cited as the basis of those objections 
must themselves be environmentally grounded in order to be con-
sidered under NEP A and Section 404. 295 
Assuming that a secondary effect of a proposed project is at issue, 
the proximate cause test comes into play. Naturally, all Corps wet-
lands permitting decisions have a broad array of secondary effects. 
If the Corps were required to evaluate each and every possible 
secondary effect in its public interest review process, in which the 
Corps weighs the benefits of a proposal against its detriments,296 the 
292 The Court in Metropolitan Edison held that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission did not 
have ~o prepare an EIS to evaluate mere risk. See id. at 767. The Court then supported its 
position by maintaining that risk is too attenuated on the causal chain to require consideration 
in an EIS, and that some sort of proximate causation must be involved to determine the range 
of factors that do require consideration in an EIS. Id. at 774. 
Metropolitan Edison thus resembles Olmsted Citizens for a Better Community v. United 
States, 793 F.2d 201, 204, 205 (8th Cir. 1986), where a citizens group opposing a prison 
conversion in their neighborhood sought to require an EIS from the converting agency to 
gauge the possible effects of newly introduced drugs, weapons, and crime into the neighbor-
hood. See supra notes 223-30 and accompanying text. One can infer that the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that, because of the lack of a primary environmental effect, and the 
hypothetical nature of the secondary effect, the opposition was merely voicing policy objections 
rather than legitimate environmental concerns. Olmsted, 793 F.2d at 203. NEPA, the court 
stated, is designed to protect the environment, not to address citizens' fears and objections 
when those fears and objections are not coupled with a primary environmental effect. See id. 
293 The Court merely referred to the doctrine of proximate cause in attempting to delineate 
the nexus required between a primary effect on the environment and a related effect, in order 
to require evaluation of that related effect in an EIS. Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. at 774. 
294 I d.; see also supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text. 
295 The Olmsted and Metropolitan Edison courts held that fears and policy objections need 
not be considered in an EIS. See supra notes 223-30, 80-88 and accompanying text. Other 
cases, however, support the proposition that secondary effects, if they are the reasonably 
foreseeable results of a primary effect on the environment, must be considered by the federal 
agency administering the project. See, e.g., McDowell v. Schlesinger, 404 F. Supp. 221 (W.D. 
Mo. 1975); City of Rochester v. United States Postal Serv., 541 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1976);. Sierra 
Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868 (lst Cir. 1985); Hough v. Marsh, 557 F. Supp. 74 (D. Mass. 1982). 
See supra notes 212-17 and accompanying text (discussing McDowell); 200-04 and accom-
panying text (discussing City of Rochester); 251-66 and accompanying text (discussing Sierra 
Club v. Marsh); 236--50 and accompanying text (discussing Hough). 
296 See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text. 
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scales would consistently be tipped against development. Consistent 
and predictable Corps permitting decisions require an easily applied 
cutoff point that can treat various fact patterns consistently to avoid 
stifling development while protecting wetlands. 
Reasonable foreseeability is the standard often associated with 
proximate causation tests. 297 The question becomes: Is secondary 
factor X a reasonably foreseeable result of primary effect Y, which 
results from project A? If the secondary effect is reasonably fore-
seeable, it should be considered by the Corps in its evaluation of the 
merits and costs of a given project. 
Sierra Club v. Marsh illustrates this reasonable foreseeability 
test. 298 In Sierra Club v. Marsh, the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
set up some guidelines to define which reasonably foreseeable effects 
should be included in the Corps's threshold decision on whether or 
not to prepare an EIS.299 According to these guidelines, the Corps 
need not consider highly speculative or indefinite impacts.3oo Thus, 
the Corps must be reasonably certain that a secondary effect will 
result before it considers that effect in its PIR. The second guideline 
is a temporal consideration: the Corps must determine whether, if 
the secondary effects are not considered before the project has 
started, it will be too late to consider them during or after the 
primary project is completed.301 
In its detailed opinion, the Sierra Club v. Marsh court generally 
adhered to the NEPA policy of evaluating the cumulative effects of 
a project at its starting point. Obviously, many projects could be 
parsed into discrete units, none of which would alone significantly 
affect the human environment. For example, in Sierra Club, the 
First Circuit was merely forcing the Corps to consider the project 
as a whole: first the causeway and cargo port, and then the effects 
on wetlands of the development likely to stem from the primary 
construction. 302 By combining the primary with the reasonably fore-
seeable secondary effects, the Corps can obtain a more accurate 
picture of the real costs and benefits of a proposal, and can avoid 
297 See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
298 See supra notes 251-66 and accompanying text. 
299 Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 878 (1st Cir. 1985); see supra notes 251-66 and 
accompanying text. 
3()() 769 F.2d at 878. 
301 I d. Corps regulations require the Corps to consider the cumulative impacts of a proposal. 
33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (1988). If one project that requires a Section 404 permit is designed to 
lead to other projects, which also will require wetlands fill permits, the Corps arguably may 
consider the cumulative impact at a preliminary stage. This is not to suggest that the Corps 
can consider future non-Section 404 projects in its cumulative overview of a project. 
302 See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d at 881-82. 
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the nibbling away of the environment by small individual projects 
that cause major environmental impacts in the aggregate. 
By requiring the Corps to evaluate the cumulative effects of a 
project, courts force the Corps to adhere to its own regulations. 303 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hough v. Marsh, criticized 
the Corps for failing to consider the cumulative impact of a proposal 
to fill wetlands in light of existing and anticipated projects in the 
area. 301 Because Corps regulations required a complete evaluation 
of all reasonably foreseeable secondary effects,305 as well as a cu-
mulative look at a proposal,306 the court ordered the Corps to comply 
with its own regulations and evaluate the project accordingly. 307 
The guiding principles for consistent Corps application of its Sec-
tion 404 wetlands permitting process consist of the following factors. 
The Corps must inquire if there is a primary effect on the environ-
ment requiring the Corps to exercise its Section 404 permitting 
process. This step weeds out the mere policy objections that are not 
the result of any primary effect on the environment. If the secondary 
effects objected to are mere policy objections or fear, there is no 
need to consider the objections. 
N ext, the Corps must determine whether these secondary effects 
are actual and verifiable. 308 This step of the test is the most fact-
specific. The Corps naturally cannot investigate and verify each and 
every possible secondary effect. Those objecting to a proposal can 
raise objections supported by evidence, which the Corps can then 
weigh and verify or dismiss. This evidentiary procedure will alleviate 
the problem of exhausting Corps resources chasing stray ends. As 
Sierra Club309 and Hough v. Marsh310 indicate, however, the Corps 
is responsible for evaluating all reasonably foreseeable cumulative 
effects of a project. 
The Corps must also determine whether the secondary effects in 
question are the reasonably foreseeable results of the project. If 
303 Hough v. Marsh, 557 F. Supp. 74 (D. Mass. 1982). See supra notes 236-50 and accom-
panying text. 
304 Hough, 557 F. Supp. at 86. 
305 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (1988). 
306 [d. 
307 See Hough, 557 F. Supp. at 86. A similar result was reached in McDowell v. Schlesinger, 
404 F. Supp. 221 (W.D. Mo. 1975), where the Department of Defense was required to adhere 
to NEPA's policies when it had included those policies in its own regulations. See supra notes 
212-17 and accompanying text. 
308 See supra notes 153-68 and accompanying text. 
309 See supra notes 251-66 and accompanying text. 
310 See supra notes 236-50 and accompanying text. 
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there is no sufficient nexus between the primary and secondary 
effects, the Corps should not consider them, because Corps regula-
tions,311 CEQ guidelines,312 and Metropolitan Edison313 all require 
that a secondary effect be proximately caused by the primary effect 
before it must be evaluated in the Section 404 permitting program. 
An additional inquiry for the Corps is whether the secondary 
effects must be considered when the project is initially proposed, or 
whether they can be dealt with at a later date. Again, this is clearly 
a fact question. If no future development is contemplated or reason-
ably foreseeable at the time of a permit application, the concomitant 
secondary effects need not be considered. If evidence indicates, 
however, that a particular project, if permitted, will pave the way 
for future development and environmental changes over which the 
Corps can claim jurisdiction, then those future changes should be 
evaluated before a permit is granted if they would deprive the Corps 
of a meaningful choice at a later date. 
The Corps must ask whether the overall, cumulative effects of a 
project have been examined. If a project is interrelated with other 
development or wetlands fill projects, all must be considered as a 
unit. 314 If the opportunity to evaluate secondary effects resulting 
from the primary effect will be lost, the Corps must consider all 
reasonably foreseeable secondary effects in its original permitting 
process. 
These guiding principles, if applied by the Corps in its Section 404 
wetlands permitting process, will provide a consistent, predictable 
framework for wetlands permitting decisions. In addition, courts 
could refer to these judicially derived guidelines in reviewing Corps 
actions. Arguably, if the Corps has adhered to these guidelines, its 
actions are less likely to be seen by courts as arbitrary and capri-
cious. 
By restoring a more deferential standard of judicial review to the 
Corps's actions, the above guidelines can provide the upper limit of 
agency actions. Because Metropolitan Edison sets only the lower 
limit, that degree of secondary effect consideration that an agency 
is obligated to perform,315 the upper limit is in effect set by the 
latitude given to the Corps by courts in defining and applying the 
311 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (1988). 
312 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7(1988). 
313 See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text. 
314 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (1988). 
315 See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text. 
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proximate causation test. A narrow reading of this standard will 
lead to limited consideration of secondary effects, which will lower 
the amount of wetlands protection the Corps can provide. Limits of 
this sort force the Corps to look at a short-range, less cumulative 
scope of the overall effects of a wetlands fill project. 
Because NEPA316 and Corps regulations317 each require the Corps 
to evaluate a comprehensive array of the primary and secondary 
effects of a wetlands fill permit, courts should defer to the Corps's 
permitting decisions if those decisions are not arbitrary and capri-
cious.3ls NEPA's broad policies,319 which the Supreme Court in Met-
ropolitan Edison320 explicitly required federal agencies to consider, 
should thus set the upper limit for agency consideration of secondary 
effects. 
Applying these judicially derived guidelines to the facts of Mall 
Properties,321 it seems that the Corps was arguably within its au-
thority under Section 404, NEP A, and its own regulations in weigh-
ing the social and economic effects on New Haven in its permitting 
process. Certainly, the filling of twenty-five acres of wetlands and 
floodplains requires a Section 404 permit application. 322 Moreover, 
the secondary social and economic factors at issue are environmen-
tally based. 323 Urban decay and density changes have frequently 
been upheld as proper subjects of concern under NEPA.324 
The factual issue of whether the seconda~y factors were actual 
and verifiable is a question that could have gone either way. Expert 
testimony indicated a substantial likelihood of urban decay as a result 
of the mall, with accompanying unemployment, abandonment of 
buildings, loss of revenue, and increases in crime.325 Because this is 
a fact issue, the court should have confined itself to reviewing the 
Corps's decision by the arbitrary and capricious standard of re-
view. 326 Here, such a standard would have been appropriate because 
the evidence supported the likelihood of urban decay,327 Corps reg-
316 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
317 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (1988). 
318 See supra notes 148-88 and accompanying text. 
319 See supra notes 29-65 and accompanying text. 
320 See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text. 
321 See supra notes 267-81 and accompanying text. 
322 See supra note 269. 
323 See supra notes 267-81 and accompanying text. 
324 See supra notes 200-11 and accompanying text. 
325 See supra note 271 and accompanying text. 
326 See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
327 See supra note 271 and accompanying text. 
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ulations permit consideration of these economic and social factors, 328 
and NEPA's policies of protecting the environment329 would have 
been advanced by the process the Corps used in Mall Properties. 
In addition, the social and economic effects on downtown New 
Haven are reasonably foreseeable. Currently undergoing an urban 
renewal process,330 New Haven's fragile downtown would seriously 
be threatened by a new mall in the vicinity. There was thus a clear 
causal connection between the new mall and the harm to New Haven. 
Finally, the costs of a decision to grant a permit to fill the wetlands 
in question in Mall Properties included the secondary social and 
economic effects on downtown New Haven. If the Corps is to eval-
uate the effects of a permitting decision solely by looking at the 
primary environmental effect, the filling of wetlands, it will not be 
able to protect wetlands by evaluating the actual, cumulative costs 
of the wetlands permit. For instance, if the Corps evaluates the fill 
permit by looking at its inevitable result, a large suburban mall with 
attendant traffic, noise, popUlation expansion, and other secondary 
effects, the Corps will be evaluating the real cost of the project. 
By looking at the facts, the underlying goals of NEPA, and the 
judicial policy of deference to agency decisions, it seems that the 
Corps made a rational decision in Mall Properties to deny the permit. 
Thus, the court erred in intervening to remand the matter to the 
Corps for reconsideration of the permit application without consid-
ering the secondary factors331 because the Corps's decision was not 
arbitrary and capricious. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Wetlands, a vital natural resource, are rapidly disappearing. The 
United States Army Corps of Engineers, with its control over the 
Section 404 wetlands permitting process, is in a position to limit this 
loss. 
This Comment argues that the Corps should be granted broad 
discretion to protect wetlands. Section 404's goal of wetlands pre-
servation and water quality control provides the starting point for 
this discretion. Under Section 404, the Corps's primary concern 
should be wetlands protection. NEP A, reflected in Corps regula-
328 See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (1988). 
329 See supra notes 29-65 and accompanying text. 
330 Record of Decision, supra note 269, at 10. 
331 Mall Properties, Inc. v. Marsh, 672 F. Supp. 561, 565 (D. Mass. 1987), appeal dismissed, 
841 F.2d 440 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 128 (1988). 
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tions, expands the Corps's discretion to consider a broad range of 
effects of a project during its permitting process. 
By considering the cumulative effects of a permit to fill wetlands, 
the Corps is evaluating the "real" costs of a project on the environ-
ment. Conversely, if the Corps is prohibited from evaluating the 
total impact of a project, "real" costs go unassessed, and the balance 
of detriments and benefits resulting from a project is biased in favor 
of the developer. 
By limiting too strictly the Corps's consideration of secondary 
effects, Mall Properties sets a dangerous precedent, which may 
cause even more loss of wetlands. Given the clear national policy of 
NEP A, and the expansive goal of wetlands protection in Section 404, 
courts should avoid interfering with agency actions that further 
these goals and policies. 
